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Abstract:
Using data for 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities, we estimate the impact of 
national and local economic conditions on legislative electoral outcomes over the 
period from the reestablishment of democracy in 1974 to the present. Empirical 
results indicate that the performance of the national economy is important but that 
the municipal situation also conditions electoral outcomes.
Keywords: Voting functions, opportunism, local governments, elections, 
Portugal.
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1. Introduction
The influence of economic conditions on electoral outcomes and on the popularity 
of incumbent politicians has been investigated at least since the 1970s, following
the seminal works of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Mueller (1970), and Kramer 
(1971). Since then, numerous studies have proven the importance of economic 
voting, as surveyed by Paldam (2004). 
Most researchers have used measures of aggregate economic conditions to 
explain incumbent party vote shares or survey-based measures of the popularity of 
political entities. However, there are good reasons to think that local economic 
conditions may influence national electoral results, independently from the 
national economy. First, people may hold incumbent politicians accountable for 
the local economy because they think the policies implemented have had a 
stronger impact on industries located in their area of residence. Second, although 
voters may intend to evaluate incumbents for the evolution of the national 
economy, they perceive local conditions more accurately and may use them as 
proxies for the overall situation of the country. An additional reason to use data 
disaggregated at the local level is that in regression analyses it increases the 
number of degrees of freedom, allowing for a richer analysis. 
However, the number of papers assessing the importance of local 
economic indicators on national electoral outcomes is small, and most studies 
focus on the U.S. and the U.K.1 All studies report evidence confirming that it is 
important to take into account local as well as national conditions when trying to 
explain national electoral results. In the context of the 1997 British general 
elections, Johnston and Pattie (2001) go even further, arguing that voters 
1 Among others, see Holbrook (1991), Strumpf and Phillippe (1999), Eisenberg and Ketcham 
(2004) for U.S. presidential elections; and Johnston and Pattie (2001) for British general elections. 
For French legislative elections refer to Auberger and Dubois (2005).
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evaluated the incumbent government on the basis of their local area and personal 
situations, much more than on their evaluations of the state of the national 
economy.
For a recent democracy like Portugal, which changed regime in 1974, it is 
difficult to estimate aggregate time series voting functions for legislative 
elections. Veiga and Veiga (2004a) and Veiga and Veiga (2004b) tried to 
overcome this problem by analyzing monthly data for, respectively, the popularity 
of the four main Portuguese political entities, and vote intentions for the main 
political parties. Both studies presented supportive results for the hypothesis that 
the electorate holds incumbents responsible for the evolution of the economy, 
particularly for the behaviour of unemployment and inflation. However, the 
determinants of actual votes in legislative Portuguese elections have not yet been 
researched. The main objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. By 
combining aggregate time series information with panel data at the municipal 
level, we increase the number of observations, which allows us to use votes as the 
dependent variable and to consider the impact of both national and economic 
conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly describe the 
Portuguese legislative elections and parties in government. In section 3 we present 
the data and specify the empirical model. The empirical results are reported in 
section 4 and, finally, section 5 presents the conclusions.
2. Portuguese legislative elections and parties in government
After 48 years of dictatorship, the 25th of April 1974 revolution re-established 
democracy in Portugal. The initial years of the democratic period in Portugal were 
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characterized by political instability, with governments repeatedly falling before 
the ends of their terms. The first legislative elections for the Assembly of the 
Republic were held in April 1976, and Mário Soares, the leader of the Socialist 
Party (PS), led the first elected democratic government. Two presidentially
appointed governments followed, before the balloting of 1979, in which the 
Democratic Alliance2 (AD) won 42.2% of the votes, getting an overall majority of 
deputies in Parliament. Sá Carneiro, leader and founder of the Social Democratic 
Party (PSD), became the prime minister and in the October 1980 elections the AD 
renewed its overall majority of deputies. Two months later, Sá Carneiro died in an 
airplane accident and Pinto Balsemão was elected head of PSD and became Prime 
Minister. Divisions among coalition members caused the resignation of Pinto 
Balsemão in December 1982, and new elections were scheduled for April 1983.
[Insert table 1 about here]
In the 1983 balloting, the PS achieved 36.3% of the votes and formed a 
coalition government with the PSD. After the break-up of the coalition in 1985, 
elections where held in October and the PSD gained the largest vote share, but fell 
short of gaining a majority of seats in Parliament. Cavaco Silva formed a minority 
government, which fell in April 1987 following a no confidence vote.
During the 1987 election campaign Cavaco Silva emphasized the need of 
economic and political stability for Portugal’s successful integration into the 
European Community, which had occurred in January 1986. The PSD won 50.1% 
of the votes in the legislative balloting of July 1987, and was able to form the first 
one-party overall majority since the end of the dictatorship, and was therefore also 
2
 A right-wing alliance formed by the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Democratic and Social 
Center / People’s Party (CDS/PP) and  the Monarchic People’s Party (PPM).
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the first to complete its term of office. A new majority was earned in the 
legislative elections of October 1991. 
In the 1995 and 1999 legislative ballotings the PS got the largest vote 
share, 43.8% and 44.0% of the votes respectively, almost achieving overall 
majorities of deputies in Parliament. António Guterres, the leader of PS since 
1992, became prime minister of the two PS minority governments. He resigned 
after the disappointing results the PS had in the December 2001 municipal 
elections, forcing the President of the Republic to call for early elections. In 
March 17, 2002 the PSD earned the most votes with a share of 40.1%, and it 
formed a coalition government with the third party, CDS/PP, which earned 8.7% 
of the votes. Following a Presidential dismissal of the government, elections were 
called for February 2005. Since then, the country has been run by the socialists, 
who have a comfortable overall majority of seats in the National Assembly, and 
José Socrates is the prime minister.
3. Data and model specification
The dataset consists of data on national economic variables and on a set of 
political, financial and economic variables for the 278 Portuguese mainland 
municipalities, for legislative election years. The national consumer price index, 
real GDP, industrial production index and employment were obtained from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and the national unemployment rate was 
obtained from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. Political data, namely 
election dates and electoral results were obtained from the Technical Staff for 
Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos 
para o Processo Eleitoral- STAPE) of the Internal Affairs Ministry. Data on the 
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total number of employees in firms within each municipality and on their average 
wages, which is available from 1985 to 2003, was obtained from the “Quadros de 
Pessoal” database, of the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity 
(MTSS).3 Data on municipal expenditures and grants received from the central 
government were obtained from the local authority’s (Direcção Geral das 
Autarquias Locais) annual publication called Finanças Municipais (Municipal 
Finances). This report exists from 1979 to 1983 and from 1986 to 2003. For the 
two missing years data was collected directly from the municipalities’ official 
accounts and are incomplete: we have 182 observations for 1984 and 189 for 
1985. Data on municipal purchasing power indexes (available from 1993 to 2004) 
and population were obtained from the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics 
(Instituto Nacional de Estatística- INE). Finally, the municipal income index, 
since 1992, was obtained from the Marktest’s Sales Index database. 
The empirical models are to be estimated using a panel of 278 
municipalities, over a maximum of nine national legislative elections.4 The 
dependent variable in all models is the percentage of votes obtained by the 
principal party in government (that of the Prime Minister) in the current elections,
Votes. In the set of explanatory variables, we first include the percentage of votes 
obtained by the incumbent in the previous balloting, Votes (Previous Election). 
This variable accounts for the support the main government party enjoyed at the 
start of the term and for factors not considered in the other explanatory variables, 
3
 The “Quadros de Pessoal” is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers virtually all 
privately owned firms employing paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are 
not included). Although the most recent year for which data is available is 2003, unfortunately, 
there is no data on wages for 2001.
4
 There were 11 legislative elections since the restoration of democracy in 1974. But, the use of the 
results obtained by the principal government party in the previous election implies that the first 
one (1976) is not considered. The last one, which occurred in 2005, is also not considered because 
there is no data available for 2005 on most of the municipal level variables.
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such as personal characteristics, ideology and party affiliation of voters, socio-
economic characteristics of each municipality, etc.
It is possible that, in each municipality, the votes for the main government 
party are affected by whether or not the mayor is affiliated with the latter. We 
account for this possibility by including the dummy variable Government’s Party, 
which takes the value of one when the mayor’s party is that of the Prime Minister, 
and equals zero otherwise. A positive coefficient can be expected if we assume 
that a mayor is able to help her party get more votes in her municipality.
However, if voters prefer not to concentrate all the power in one party, a negative 
coefficient could result for this variable. This would be in accordance with 
Alesina and Rosenthal’s (1996) model for the U.S., which predicts a midterm 
electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in 
midterm congressional elections. 
As mentioned in the introduction, national economic conditions play an 
important role in legislative elections results. Furthermore, using time series data 
for Portugal, Veiga and Veiga (2004a and 2004b) showed that higher inflation 
and unemployment lead to lower popularity and vote intentions for the 
government. Thus, negative estimated coefficients are expected for inflation (the 
percentage change in the CPI) and for the change in the unemployment rate. We 
also account for national economic conditions by including GDP growth and 
changes in employment and in the industrial production index. Because higher 
values of any of these imply improving economic conditions, which should lead 
to more votes for the incumbent, positive coefficients are expected for these three 
variables.
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We also expect municipal economic conditions to affect votes. Although 
there is no data on inflation and unemployment rates at the municipal level, there 
is information on some variables that reflect the local economy’s performance. 
The first two used are the change in municipal employment and the change in 
average municipal real wages. Then, we include changes in two indexes that 
reflect municipalities’ wealth: the INE’s purchasing power index, and the 
Marktest’s income index.5 Increases in any of these variables imply improving 
economic conditions, so positive coefficients are expected.
Finally, we account for the effects of grants transferred by the central 
government to each municipality. Veiga and Pinho (2005) have shown that in 
legislative election years, central governments increase the amount of funds
transferred to municipalities, particularly non-formula grants.6 If this opportunistic 
spending pays off in terms of votes obtained, the annual change in non-formula 
grants should turn out as statistically significant and positively signed.
The first group of estimations includes only the national economic 
variables, making its results easily comparable to those of Veiga and Veiga 
(2004a,b). Then, in a second group, municipal lev l variables are incorporated in 
order to determine if local conditions also affect national legislative election 
results. The empirical model can be summarized as follows:
ittitititelpreviit GPVotesVotes  ++++++=  2
'
1,1
'
..,
MunNat
2002,1999,1995,1991,1987,1985,1983,1980,1979278,...,1 == ti (1)
5
 The income index takes into consideration the fiscal burden, electricity consumption, 
automobiles sales and the number of bank agencies and of retail stores in each municipality. 
6
 Since part of the grants transferred to municipalities is formula-related, non-formula grants are 
more easily manipulated by opportunistic governments than total grants. 
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8
where Votesit is the percentage of votes obtained in municipality i by the 
incumbent government’s principal party in the election of year t, Votesi,prev.el. is the 
percentage of votes it obtained in the previous election, GPit stands for 
Government’s Party, Nat is a vector of national economic variables (whose values 
are equal for all municipalities), Mun is a vector of municipal variables, i is the 
individual effect of municipality i, t is a dummy variable for the election of year 
t, it is the error term,  and  are parameters and 	1 and 	2 are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated. Descriptive statistics for all variables used are 
reported in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
4. Empirical results
The first set of estimations performed includes only the political and the national 
economic variables. In order to determine the relevant time horizon for the 
Portuguese voters, we expressed the national economic variables in two different 
ways: first, as percentage changes from the previous year; and, second, as average 
percentage annual changes over the entire term (since the previous election year).7
Results of the panel data models, controlling for fixed effects8 of municipalities
and election-specific effects, are shown in Table 3. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses and the degree of statistical significance is signalled with asterisks. 
The number of observations, municipalities and elections, and the adjusted R-
squared are reported at the foot of the table.
7
 Since most Portuguese governments did not complete their terms, we have different term lengths 
in our sample. Thus, in order to make the changes in economic variables comparable over terms, 
they are expressed as average annual changes.
8
 Municipal dummy variables are globally statistically significant, and Hausman tests indicate that 
a fixed effects specification is always preferable to a random effects one. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results indicate that there is a high degree of persistence in the 
percentage of votes, as the estimated coefficient of Votes (Previous Election) is 
almost 0.9. The principal party in government seems to do worse in municipalities 
controlled by mayors affiliated with it. In line with Alesina and Rosenthal (1996), 
this result suggests that voters act strategically by trying to avoid the control of 
local and national governments by the same party. 
Most of the results concerning national economic variables conform to our 
expectations. National Inflation has a negative sign and is statistically significant 
at the 1% significance level in all estimations except that of column 5; the Change 
in the Unemployment Rate has a negative coefficient and is also statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level; GDP Growth has a positive coefficient 
(although it is not statistically significant in column 2); and the Change in 
Employment and the Change in the Industrial Production Index have positive 
signs and are always highly statistically significant. Thus, these results confirm 
those of the vote/popularity function literature, according to which higher 
inflation and worse real economic performance (higher unemployment, lower 
growth, lower unemployment or lower industrial production) lead to lower votes 
and popularity. Concerning the time horizon relevant to voters, both annual 
changes in economic variables and changes over entire terms seem to matter. But, 
as estimated coefficients for the former are of higher magnitude, Portuguese 
voters seem to attach greater importance to the very recent past.
Municipal variables are included in the estimations of Table 4. The 
estimation reported in column 1 adds the Change in Municipal Employment, the 
Change in Municipal Wages and the Percentage Annual Change in Non-Formula 
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Grants to the Municipality to the model of column 1 of Table 3. While annual 
changes in municipal employment and wages do not seem to affect votes, 
increasing grants to municipalities in election years leads to a higher vote
percentage.9 In column 2, the Change in the Municipal Purchasing Power Index is 
added to the model. Results indicate that increases in the purchasing power of a 
municipality relative to the country average are associated with greater 
percentages of votes for the incumbent. The change in the income index (column 
3), is also positively signed and significant, implying that improvements in the 
municipal economy help the national government get more votes. Average 
changes over the term are used in columns 4 and 5. Results are very similar to 
those of columns 1 and 2, except that the Change in Municipal Employment is 
statistically significant in column 4.10
[Insert Table 4 about here]
5. Conclusions
Although Veiga and Veiga (2004a and 2004b) present evidence of the importance 
of economic conditions on vote-intentions and on the popularity of political 
entities in Portugal, the determinants of the votes cast in legislative elections had 
never been investigated. This derives, in part, from the fact that the Portuguese 
democracy has only existed 32 years, and the number of national elections 
observed is consequently small. This paper intends to fill this gap in the literature 
by using data disaggregated to the municipal level and combining the cross-
9 Veiga and Pinho (2005) showed that Portuguese governments have in fact opportunistically 
increased grants to municipalities in election years.
10
 The average change in the income index over the entire term is not statistically significant.
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sectional and time-series dimensions, resulting in a panel with more than two 
thousand observations. 
Results indicate that both national and local economic conditions influence 
electoral outcomes, and that the former play a major role. The performance of the 
national economy is taken into account by inflation, unemployment/employment, 
GDP growth and the industrial production index. All national economic indicators 
were significant determinants of votes, with strongest results obtained when 
variables were measured as percentage changes over the year preceding elections. 
Among the indicators of municipal economic performance employment, the 
purchasing power index, the income index, and the amount of non-formula grants 
received by municipalities from the national government also influence votes in 
legislative elections.
Our findings reinforce those of Veiga and Veiga (2004a, 2004b) that 
Portuguese voters hold incumbents responsible for the evolution of the economy. 
Economic voting is important in Portugal. They are also in line with most of the 
studies for other nations that highlight the stronger effect of national rather than 
local economic conditions on votes. 
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Table 1: Legislative elections and parties in government
Dates of elections Winning party % Votes Prime-Minister Form of government
April 25, 1976
-
-
December 2, 1979
October 5, 1980
April 25, 1983
October 6, 1985
July 19, 1987
October 6, 1991
October 1, 1995
October 10, 1999
March 17, 2002
February 20, 2005
PS
-
-
AD
AD
PS
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PPD/PSD
PS
PS
PPD/PSD
PS
34.9%
-
-
42.2%
44.4%
36.3%
29.7%
50.1%
50.4% 
43.8%
44.0%
40.1% 
45.0%
Mário Soares
Mota Pinto
M. L. Pintassilgo
Sá Carneiro
Pinto Balsemão
Mário Soares
Cavaco Silva
Cavaco Silva
Cavaco Silva
António Guterres
António Guterres
Durão Barroso(a)
José Sócrates
One party, minority
Pres. appointment (1978-79)
Pres. appointment (1979-80)
Coalition (PSD+CDS+PPM)
Coalition (PSD+CDS+PPM)
Coalition (PS+PSD)
One party, minority
One party, majority
One party, majority
One party, minority
One party, minority
Coalition (PSD+CDS/PP)
One party, majority
Source: Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process of the Internal Affairs 
Ministry.
Notes: PPD/PSD - People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party; PS - Socialist Party; 
CDS/PP - Democratic and Social Center / People’s Party; PPM - Monarchic People’s 
Party; AD = PSD + CDS + PPM.
(a) In July 2004 Durão Barroso resigned and a new government, also a coalition of PSD 
and CDS/PP was formed under the leadership of Santana Lopes.
Page 15 of 18
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
15
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observ. Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Votes 2477 39.80 16.34 6.71 85.45
Votes (Previous Election) 2477 42.51 15.18 5.47 87.49
Government’s Party 2475 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
National Inflation (%change in CPI) (Annual) 2477 12.79 8.27 2.30 25.11
National Inflation (Term) 2202 15.52 10.81 2.68 30.99
% Change in the Unemployment Rate (Annual) 2477 0.17 12.88 -17.73 24.08
% Change in the Unemployment Rate (Term) 2202 1.64 10.01 -10.53 18.38
Real GDP Growth (Annual) 2200 3.86 1.93 -0.17 8.44
Real GDP Growth (Term) 2202 3.01 1.79 0.51 4.94
Change in Employment (Annual) 2477 1.93 2.90 -2.18 8.68
Change in Employment (Term) 2202 1.58 2.06 -2.14 5.16
Change in the Industrial Production Index (Annual) 2477 3.35 3.27 -1.27 9.01
Change in the Industrial Production Index (Term) 2202 3.99 3.05 0.18 9.85
Change in Municipal Employment (Annual) 1357 3.38 11.66 -39.75 49.60
Change in Municipal Employment (Term) 1371 5.32 7.75 -33.73 48.52
Change in Municipal Real Wages (Annual) 1378 2.00 5.15 -26.97 26.07
Change in Municipal Real Wages (Term) 1378 2.68 3.12 -8.88 24.73
% Annual Change in Non-Formula Grants to the 
Municipality
1540 385.52 7336.33 -99.48 282104
% Annual Change in the Income Index 825 0.31 3.69 -13.79 31.82
% Change in the Purchasing Power Index (Annual) 825 1.58 5.32 -25.27 25.57
% Change in the Purchasing Power Index (Term) 825 7.62 14.28 -40.35 80.61
Sources: DGAL, IMF, INE, OECD, MTSS, Marktest, STAPE and municipal official accounts.
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Table 3: Effects of the National Economy on Votes
Percentage changes from the previous year Average percentage changes over term
Votes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Votes (Previous Election) .895
(130)***
.851
(107)***
.895
(130)***
.895
(130)***
.885
(113)***
.885
(118)***
.885
(118)***
.885
(118)***
Government’s Party -.726
(-4.23)***
-.051
(-.27)
-.726
(-4.23)***
-.726
(-4.23)***
-1.043
(-5.28)***
-1.043
(-5.49)***
-1.043
(-5.49)***
-1.043
(-5.49)***
National Inflation (%change 
in CPI)
-.796
(-24.9)***
-1.535
(-19.8)***
-2.579
(-34.5)***
-10.762
(-37.9)***
.099
(6.18)***
-.273
(-22.5)***
-.185
(-15.9)***
-.677
(-28.5)***
Change in the 
Unemployment Rate
-.681
(-38.9)***
-.571
(-21.8)***
GDP Growth .109(.35)
2.440
(23.8)***
Change in Employment 22.581
(38.9)***
4.770
(23.8)***
Change in the Industrial 
Production Index
28.714
(38.9)***
2.066
(23.8)***
# Observations 2475 2198 2475 2475 2201 2201 2201 2201
# Municipalities 278 275 278 278 278 278 278 278
# Elections 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8
Adjusted R2 .94 .94 .95 .95 .93 .94 .94 .94
Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for fixed effects of municipalities and election years. Votes, the 
dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent. Models estimated with a constant. 
T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%.
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Table 4: Effects of the National and Local Economies on Votes
Percentage changes from the previous 
year
Average percentage 
changes over term
Votes 1 2 3 4 5
Votes (Previous Election) .964
(107)***
.930
(97.8)***
.931
(94.3)***
.961
(106)***
.930
(94.8)***
Government’s Party -.192
(-.96) 
-.885
(-4.24)***
-.876
(-4.21)***
-.193
(-.97) 
-.884
(-4.26)***
National Inflation (change in CPI) -2.427
(-30.4)***
-2.144
(-16.1)***
-2.150
(-15.6)***
-6.781
(-40.4)***
-.439
(-3.51)***
Change in the Unemployment Rate -2.474
(-46.9)***
-.743
(-42.7)***
-.739
(-44.6)***
-9.182
(-42.5)***
-.536
(-26.2)***
Change in Municipal Employment .012
(1.32)
-.012
(-1.24) 
 .043
(2.76)***
.003 
(.17) 
Change in Municipal Wages .011
(.38)
-.015
(-.49)
.018
(.38)
-.015
(-.31)
Change in the Municipal Purchasing 
Power Index
.047
(1.99)**
.029
(3.37)***
Change in the Income Index .030
(2.15)**
% Annual Change in Non-Formula 
Grants to the Municipality
.00001
(2.02)***
.002
(2.34)**
.002
(2.67)***
.00001
(1.86)*
.002
(2.84)***
# Observations 1347 815 825 1361 823
# Municipalities 278 275 275 277 275
# Elections 5 3 3 5 3
Adjusted R2 .93 .93 .93 .93 .93
Notes: Panel regressions, for election years. Models estimated with a constant and election-year 
dummies. Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the 
incumbent. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%.
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